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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623 (hereinafter,
"vehicle"). This vehicle is the defendant in this suit and was held not subject to forfeiture
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 et seq.
Brian Jenkins (hereinafter, "Mr. Jenkins"), owned the vehicle at the time of the
criminal act and at the time of its seizure. Jenkins then sold his interest in the vehicle to
Constance Gartrell.
Constance Gartrell (hereinafter "Mrs. Gartrell"), is the claimant and respondent.
She purchased Jenkins' interest in the vehicle for $9,000 after the vehicle had been
impounded for lapsed registration and before the State had issued a notice of seizure.
Troy Gartrell (hereinafter "Troy"), is the son of Mrs. Gartrell.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

i Court of Appeals
i Case No. 900388-CA

1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner
bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623,

]
]I Supreme Court Case No. 900150
]I Priority No.

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION/NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
I.

The state appealed this case to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4).
II.

This is an appeal brought by the State of Utah on a forfeiture action filed in

the Second Judicial District Court of Utah in an in rem proceeding against a vehicle owned
by Mrs. Gartrell. A trial was held before the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby on January
25,1990. The court denied the state's request for forfeiture of the vehicle.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court was within its discretion when it found that Constance

Gartrell lawfully purchased the vehicle from its previous owner, Brad Jenkins.
2.

Whether Mr. Jenkins had knowledge or consent of the violation pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13.
3.

Whether the vehicle seized by the state was subject to forfeiture pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987, as amended), is determinative and the entire
statute is set forth as an addendum to this brief. The particular section of this code in
question is as follows:
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any
act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or
consent;

FACTS
Respondent does not dispute the facts as listed in Appellant's Brief. The following
facts are meant to supplement those facts already set forth.
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1.

Mr. Jenkins was the owner of the vehicle, having purchased it sometime

before January 1989. (Tr. 60.)
2,

On January 14,1989, Mrs. Gartrell purchased the vehicle from Mr. Jenkins

for $9,000. (Tr. 99-100.)
3-

Neither Mr. Jenkins nor Mrs. Gartrell testified that they knew of or consented

to Mike Gartrell or any other person keeping controlled substances in the vehicle.
4.

Prior to Mrs. Gartrell purchasing the vehicle, Mr. Jenkins took the vehicle to

Troy Gartrell's house so that Mr. Gartrell could have a mechanic check it. (Tr. 62.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mrs. Gartrell's vehicle was never forfeitable under the terms of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-13 because the vehicle was seized when it was lawfully owned by Mr. Jenkins who
had no knowledge or consent of the violation. Mrs. Gartrell then lawfully purchased the
vehicle from Mr. Jenkins.
The state's arguments fail because those arguments do not take into account the
exception provisions requiring that the owner of a vehicle have knowledge or give consent
to the violation. The state's arguments also fail because those arguments assume that
the state's interest in the seized property automatically vest whether or not the property
is forfeitable under the statute.

3

Even if the state obtains an unperfected interest in the seized property, that interest
never becomes perfect if it is later determined that the property is not forfeitable because
the owner lacked the requisite knowledge or consent.
ARGUMENT

Standard of Review
The standard of review is whether the findings made by the lower court were
clearly erroneous pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. Pro. 52.

POINT 1: MR. JENKINS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE AND DID NOT
CONSENT TO THE ALLEGED CRIME.
Mr. Jenkins owned the vehicle at the time of the criminal act and at the time of the
seizure. (Tr. 60) Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1 )(e)(i) provides an express exemption to
forfeiture when the criminal act occurs without the owner's knowledge or consent.
Although Mr. Jenkins was called as a state witness, the State failed to established that he
knew of or consented to the criminal act. (Tr. 59-72.) In short, the state failed in its
burden to show whether Mr. Jenkins had any connection with the crime pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)(e)(ii). The trial court was therefore well within its discretion to find
the vehicle was not forfeitable and such a finding was not clearly erroneous.
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POINT 2: MRS. GARTRELL WAS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE
VEHICLE.
Mrs. Gartreil purchased Mr. Jenkins' interest in the vehicle for full value after the
vehicle had been impounded for improper registration and before the state's notice of
seizure. (Jr. 71-72.) Mr. Jenkins testified that Mrs. Gartreil paid for the vehicle with a
$10,000 cashiers check. (Tr. 71.) She received $1,000 back for registration, insurance
et cet., making the total purchase price $9,000. (Tr. 112).
Because Mrs. Gartreil made a bona fide purchase from an owner who fell within
the statutory exemption, and because she neither knew of nor consented to the criminal
act, her ownership is exempt from forfeiture. The trial court's finding that she lawfully
purchased the vehicle was therefore not clearly erroneous.

POINT 3: THE TITLE TO THE VEHICLE NEVER VESTED WITH THE
STATE.
The State cites this Court's opinion in State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred NinetyNine. 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990) for the proposition that forfeited property immediately
vests with the state. (Appellant's Brief at 6.) Appellant misses the point that the trial court
found that the vehicle was not forfeitable and therefore could not vest with the state
because it could not be forfeited pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-14(1) (e)(ii).

5

The State concedes that Mr. Jenkins owned the car on January 6,1990, the date
of the violation. (Appellant's Brief at 6.) Yet, the State fails to note that Mr. Jenkins'
ownership renders the vehicle unforfeitable. (Conclusion of Law No. 4.)

Assuming,

arguendo, that some sort of interest does indeed vest upon commission of a criminal act,
that interest would be inchoate and unperfected subject to the judicial rights provided in
the statute for the protection of innocent owners. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9). If that
were the case, the State's rights would become perfected and capable of extinguishing
conflicting claims only after the innocent claimant's rights had been adjudicated.
The instant vesting discussed in U.S. v. Nichols. 841 F.2d 1489, (10th Cir 1989) is
the result of an explicit, considered amendment to the federal forfeiture statute. The
closest parallel to the federal approach in the Utah statute appears in Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-13(1 )(a-d), which extinguishes all property rights in certain res. Nichols. 841 F.2d
at 1486-89.
Assuming for the sake of argument that some right had vested in the state under
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-(e), that right would still be subject to the adjudication of the
rights of innocent owners under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)(e)(ii) and -(9).
U.S. v. Stowell. 133 U.S. 1; 10 S.Ct. 244, (1890), explains the nature and effect of
the portion of the State's interest that instantly vests in the state at the time of the crime.
It being admitted that the business of a distiller was not carried on with the
mortgagee's permission or connivance, and that he did not even know, until
after the seizure, that a still had been set upon the premises, it follows, for
the reasons already stated in discission the construction and effect of the
statutes in question, that the mortgage is a lien as against the United States.
6

Stowell 10 S.Ct. at 248. Similarly, the Utah statute protects the rights of third parties in
the res from forfeiture. State v. One 1983 Pontiac. 717 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Utah 1986).
The doctrine of the Guilty Res is explained in Florida Dealers and Growers Bank
v. U.S.. 279 F.2d 673, 677 (Fifth Cir. 1960).
In a forfeiture proceeding it is the property that is proceeded against.
The vehicle is held guilty as if it were a sentient being. (Cites omitted).
Under the doctrine of relation back, the illegal use of the automobile vests
title in the Government from the time of the vehicle's commission of the
crime and cuts off all "property rights" of others in the automobile. By its
nature, the remission statute assumes the validity of the forfeiture but also
assumes that outstanding interests in property and bona fide claims to
property are not snuffed out by the car's guilt. They continue viable, at least
to the extent of permitting innocent persons to ask that the sovereign temper
the strictness of the rule of forfeiture when there are equitable grounds for
relief.
In short, we recognize the full effect of the forfeiture for the purpose
of vesting title in the United States. Indeed the validity of the forfeiture is
not at issue in this case. What is of substance and at issue here is whether
under the real, as opposed to the assumed, facts of this case, the claimants
have such interest in the forfeited property as to permit the district judge to
consider whether, in the exercise of a sound discretion, he should or should
not grant remission of the forfeiture....
Florida Dealers. 279 F.2d at 677.
In the present case, the lower court determined that Mrs. Gartrell purchased the
vehicle from an innocent owner and therefore the vehicle could not be forfeited.
Therefore, any inchoate vesting remained unperfected and Mrs. Gartrell's claim should
prevail.
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The State's argument that title vests at the instant of criminal use is irrelevant, since
the only vehicle title that can vest under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1 )(e) is that of a
criminal owner or an owner in league with a criminal borrower. Neither of these legitimate
forfeiture scenarios is present in this case. Rather, this case presents a chain of title
between two parties innocent of the criminal possession of drugs.
In short, the fact that the State does or does not have an inchoate interest upon
seizure becomes irrelevant when that seizure does not result in a legal forfeiture.
Therefore, Mrs. Gartrell's interest in the car cannot be extinguished.
POINT 4: THE STATE MISCHARACTERIZES THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS.
The State claims that Mrs. Gartrell could not have any interest in the vehicle
because the lower court held that the vehicle "was seized and forfeitable." (Appellant's
Brief at 8.) This statement mischaracterizes the lower court's findings. The lower court
found that the car was properly seized. (Finding No. 1.) However, the lower court never
found that the vehicle was forfeitable. Instead, the lower court found that the State could
not forfeit the vehicle. (Conclusion No. 4). In other words, if the state cannot forfeit a
vehicle, that vehicle is not forfeitable.
The State relies on many cases for its proposition that a third party cannot obtain
title or interest to property after it has been seized by the state. The cases however, refer
tp property that has been seized and later deemed forfeitable. The mere act of seizure,
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absent the property being deemed forfeitable, does not vest an exclusive property interest
in the state. In fact, the statute has specific safeguards to protect the interests of innocent
owners and innocent holders of security interests.
POINT 5: THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD CLAIMANT ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS FOR THIS APPEAL.
This Court should award attorneys fees for the cost of the appeal because the
appeal of this action was without merit and not brought in good faith. The State's appeal
depends on ill-conceived theories which are unrelated to the heart of the applicable
statute.
The State's appeal was not brought in good faith because the state totally
overlooked the statutory consideration of third party rights under Utah Code Ann. §5837-13(1)(e). This statute was the same statute the state used for its case. The State's
lack of good faith is further shown by its failure to consider how its theory is not
supported even in the cases they cite.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the trial court's conclusion
that the vehicle was not forfeitable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<*

day of August, 1990.

David Paul White v
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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ADDENDUM

A.

Utah Code Ann., Section 58-37-13 (1987, as amended) §t seq.

B.

District Court Judgement and Findings of Fact
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A:

UTAH CODE ANN,, SECTION 58-37-13

58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure.
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and no property right exists in
them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act;
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering,
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property
described in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this
act;
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described
in Subsections (l)(a) or (1Kb), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited
under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in
charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation
of this act;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's
knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security
interest is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation
would or did take place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this act;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds
traceable to any violation of this act, and all moneys, negotiable instru723
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ments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this act; but:
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the
act;
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug
manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable
records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled
substances are forfeitable under this section; the burden of proof is
upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act; and
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating,
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or
interest in real property is subject to the bona fide security interest of
a party who could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the
act;
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under
this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the
property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at
any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over
the property. However, seizure without process may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding
under this act;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has
been used or intended to be used in violation of this act.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted promptly.
724
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(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When property is seized under this act the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant
under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances
listed in Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state
are contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are
unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I
and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this
act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths,
may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of
the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act by a finding of the court
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of
controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the
case shall award the property to the seizing agency. The seizing agency
shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency,
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal costs for filing and
pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the property to the director of the Division of Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the
need for the property and the use to which the property will be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications
for property submitted under Subsection (8Mb) and, if the seizing agency
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant
or seizing agency, where no application is made, \yho may obtain the
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or
725
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agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to exceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property.
Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing
agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection
(8)(a) or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the
property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction.
Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of
the department or his designated agent.
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfeiture
to the state shall be made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the
county attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed
in the district court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity:
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject
matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the
property has previously been seized without a warrant, under Subsection
58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the
county clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all
persons known to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by
one of the following methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and address is known, at the
last known address of the claimant, or upon each owner whose right,
title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by
mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by certified mail to the
address given upon the records of the division, which service is
deemed complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but
who are believed to have an interest in the property, by one publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the
seizure was made.
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party
shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this act, any interested person or
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under
this section, may file a petition in the district court for release of his
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest
in the property and his right to have it released. A copy shall be served
upon the county attorney in the county of the seizure, who shall answer
the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of
forfeiture.
726

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-13

(0 After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release,
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court
shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the property as the court determines. If the county attorney has not filed an
answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court shall
order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days.
At this hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights
of release of the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The
court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the
case and order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state.
(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited
and direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The
division shall dispose of the property under Subsection (8).
(j) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release,
the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture,
and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund.
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and storage of the property, against the individual
or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may
assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the property as
appropriate.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, $ 13; 1982, ch.
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9; 1987, ch. 87, 5 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective July 1, 1987. rewrote this secturn to the extent that a deUiled analysis is
impracticable.
Meaning of "this act.** — The term "this

act" means Laws 1971, ch. 145. which enacted
this chapter.
Imitation Controlled Substances Act. —
The ImiUtion Controlled Subsunces Act, re{exred to in Subsection a»«h), appears as
§§ 58-37b-l to 58-37b-8.
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B: DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS OF FACT
i'
DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
144 SOUTH 500 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

;

vs.

;

1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER,
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623

i

Case No. 45023
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.
Trial was held in above-entitled action before the Honorable
Douglas L. Cornaby on January 25, 1990. State of Utah was present
and represented by Steve Majors; Defendant/Claimant, Constance
Gartrell was present and represented by her counsel, David Paul
White.

The Court having heard all of the evidence produced and

having considered documentation entered into evidence, now makes
the following ORDER:
Said

vehicle

being

1986

Toyota

4-Runner

bearing

VIN

JT4RN6203G0057623 cannot be forfeited by the State of Utah and is
ordered returned to Constance Gartrell.
DATED this

day of

, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Douglas L. Cornaby
D i s t r i c t Court J u d g e
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
15

Steve Majors

DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
144 SOUTH 500 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

;i

1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER,
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623

I

Case No. 45023
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.
COMES NOW, the above-entitled Defendant, by and through its
counsel, David Paul White, and files the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. The vehicle in question was properly seized and impounded
on January 6, 1989, because of improper registration and operator
was driving on suspended license.
2.

Vehicle properly searched pursuant to impound on January

14, 1989. Constance Gartrell made lawful purchase of said vehicle
from previous owner, Brad Jenkins.
3.

State1s notice of its intent to seize and forfeite was

mailed to Constance Gartrell on January 16, 1989.

4.

Complaint

for forfeiture filed on January 16, 1989.

Constance Gartrell answered said Complaint

as a Claimant and

interested party on said vehicle and trial on said Complaint was
held before the above-entitled Court on January 25, 1990 • On the
foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Said vehicle was properly seized and impounded.

2.

Inventory search of said vehicle was done properly and in

the regular course of police officer procedure.
3.

Constance Gartrell was an innocent purchaser of said

vehicle.
4.

State of Utah cannot forfeiture said vehicle and said

vehicle must be returned to Constance Gartrell.
DATED this

day of Febraury, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Douglas L. Cornaby
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Steve Majors
Deputy Davis County Attorney

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
'. SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j
DAVID PAUL WHITE, being duly sworn, states that he is the attorney for the
Respondent and that he served four (4) copies of the Brief of Respondent upon:
Steven V. Major
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, UT 84025
AND that he did serve ten (10) copies of the Brief of Respondent upon:
Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
by personally delivering true copies thereof, on the }(J> day of August, 1990.

David Paul White*
Attorney for Respondent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this {U> day of August, 1990.

TBSSS

*—••»—•••••«•—•———

J

^otar/Public
()My Commission Expires: 3 ' 2 "^3
Residing at Salt Lake County
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